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INTRODUCTION 
It is a commonplace to recall that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) integrated civil and political rights (CPR) 
with economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR), and that the two 
International Covenants separated them. 
 
* François-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of 
Public Health. 
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Reflecting Cold War divisions, stress on one or the other of these 
two traditional categories tended to reveal preferences for neo-liberal 
or social democratic understandings of human rights, when it was not 
more blatantly reflective of competition between the NATO and 
Warsaw Pact (plus ―Non-Aligned‖) countries, a sort of North–West 
vs. East–South ideological split.  This article explores how the sep-
aration of categories of rights has lost its pertinence in the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century.  My purpose is to show how the separation 
into two categories is perhaps a convenient taxonomy for some, but 
subject to serious challenge from the perspectives of political history, 
the theory of rights, and contemporary policy.  
While human rights are accepted as universal because of the 
resonance of the underlying principles with all major religious and 
philosophical traditions, many of the assumptions underlying the 
separation of economic, social, and cultural rights from civil and 
political rights derive from interpretations of the philosophical ideas 
and revolutionary practices of 18
th
 century Europe and America.1  A 
few reminders of the legacy of that period may dispel the historically 
inaccurate claim that those rights falling within today‘s category of 
economic, social, and cultural were unknown to the Enlightenment 
and absent from the French Declarations of the 18
th
 century.   
First of all, to the extent that the essence of these rights is 
distributive justice or the exigencies of equality, they are echoed in 
the second element of the revolutionary triad (―liberté, égalité, 
fraternité”).  Surprising though it may be to anyone who assumes the 
Enlightenment was exclusively about liberty from state abuse, it 
should be recalled that, in the mind of many representatives of the 
Third Estate—the representatives of the commoners and the 
bourgeoisie in the Estates-General, which became the Constituent 
Assembly, and promulgated the Declaration on the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen in August 1789—human rights began with the rights 
we call today economic, social, and cultural.  Abbé Sieyès, rep-
resentative of the Third Estate from Nemours in the Estates General, 
presented a theory of human nature based on the fulfillment of human 
needs: ―Man is, by nature, subject to needs; but, by nature, has the 
means to satisfy them. . . . Individual means are linked by nature to 
 
1. See Stephen P. Marks, From the “Single Confused Page” to the “Decalogue for Six 
Billion Persons”: The Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French 
Revolution, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 459 (1998). 
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individual needs.  Whoever is responsible for needs must therefore 
freely dispose of the means.‖2  He further discussed various forms of 
inequality and explained that a purpose of society is to develop the 
moral and physical capacities of its members which it augments 
through the ―inestimable collaboration of public works and assist-
ance.‖3  His draft declaration of rights of February 17894 refers to 
―natural and social rights,‖ including the human right of each citizen 
―unable to satisfy his needs to the assistance of his fellow citizens.‖5  
In a remarkably progressive analysis, anticipating class analysis of a 
century later, the introduction attributes the ―war between the 
government and the nation, or more exactly between the government 
and the people‖ to ignorance and greed.  It seeks to go beyond the 
cessation of abuse of power and ameliorate ―all social relations‖ and 
―establish the reign of justice among all the different classes of 
citizens.‖6  After a first article stating the right to do freely what does 
not harm others, the Nemours draft declaration of rights enumerates 
what we call today welfare rights: the right to assistance from others; 
free assistance to children, the weak, and disabled; non-interruption 
during work; adequate salary for work; and the right to keep what one 
legitimately acquired through work, donation, or inheritance.  Only 
after these rights come protection against violence, expropriation, and 
violations of liberty, property, security, and rules of criminal due 
process.  Then come provisions on income taxes and finally freedom 
of expression.  The second chapter of the Nemours draft is devoted to 
public education, which must be ―highly favored‖ by the state.7  
Thus, although the Declaration of 1789 is limited in its concern with 
equality to matters of taxation and property, the concerns of equality 
and social justice were voiced, and might have found expression in 
the text had more time been spent on it.  The Dictionnaire Critique de 
la Révolution Française notes that, while the Declaration of 1793 
contains explicit social rights, ―almost half of the drafts of 1789 
include assistance, even work, among the primordial guaranties that a 
 
2. Abbé Sieyès, Préliminaire de la Constitution, Reconnaissance et Exposition Raisonnée 
des Droits de l‘Homme et du Citoyen (July 20–21, 1789), reprinted in STÉPHANE RIALS, LA 
DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN 591, 593–94 (1989) (translation by 
author). 
3. Id. at 595–99 (translation by author).  
4. Id. at 550–55 (translation by author). 
5. Id. at 605 (Article XXV) (translation by author). 
6. Id. at 551 (translation by author).  
7. Id. at 555 (translation by author).  
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collectivity owes to its members.‖8   
This heritage, along with the achievements of European socialism 
and of the Soviet Union, influenced the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration.  Albert Verdoodt wrote: 
Mr. Cassin took advantage of his background as an eminent 
jurist and his special talent for reconciling the liberalism of the 
French Declaration of 1789 and the socialism of modern 
constitutions, especially that of the USSR.  He succeeded in 
maintaining, in the declaration, both all the traditional rights 
and the new socio-economic rights.9 
According to John Humphrey, the Canadian U.N. staff member 
who contributed to the drafting of the Universal Declaration, his own 
draft ―attempted to combine humanitarian liberalism with social 
democracy.‖10  The direct impact of the socialist countries on the text 
is most noticeable in the provisions on duties to society and on 
economic, social, and cultural rights.11  It was not exclusively the 
Soviet bloc delegates that insisted on including these rights in the 
Universal Declaration.  Indeed, several delegates referred to Roose-
velt‘s Four Freedoms (1941), which included freedom from want on 
a par with freedom from fear, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
expression.12  The United States had even proposed an international 
bill of human rights in 1942, which states in Article I that the purpose 
of government was common welfare in an interdependent world, and 
in Article II that ―[a]ll persons . . . have the right to enjoy such 
 
8. DICTIONNAIRE CRITIQUE DE LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE 121–22 (François Furet & 
Mona Ozouf eds., 1988) [hereinafter Dictionnaire Critique].  The Declaration of 1793 gave 
explicit reference to the rights to social protection and education.  Article 21, for example, 
refers to public assistance as a ―sacred debt‖ and affirms that society must provide for the 
subsistence of unfortunate citizens either by finding work for them or by assuring a means of 
existence for those unable to work. 
9. ALBERT VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA DÉCLARATION UNIVERSELLE 
DES DROITS DE L‘HOMME 49 (1964) (translation by author).  As was pointed out supra, 
Verdoodt is not entirely accurate in considering social and economic rights as ―new.‖ 
10. JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVEN-
TURE 40 (1984). 
11.  ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 42 (1990).  Cassese adds 
the reference to the role of individuals ―as members of society,‖ for example, in Article 22 
on social security, and the exclusion of activities contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the U.N. (Article 29(3)) or destructive of rights (Article 30).   
12. Cassese points out, drawing on leading historians, that  Roosevelt meant by freedom 
from want—an expression he borrowed from a journalist—the elimination of certain cultural 
and commercial barriers between nations, rather than its current meaning of realization of 
economic, social, and cultural rights.  Id. at 30. 
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minimum standards of economic, social and cultural well-being as 
the resources of the country, effectively used, are capable of 
sustaining.‖13  Eleanor Roosevelt‘s motivation for including eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights was, of course, the welfare com-
mitments of her husband‘s administration and his proclaiming of 
freedom from want among the Four Freedoms.  However, it was also 
to avoid the Soviet Union taking credit for the inclusion of these 
rights, for which its delegate argued long and hard.  William Korey 
explains that ―she must have been aware that socialist principles were 
being advanced and implemented in numerous Western societies.  To 
have resisted this trend would have abdicated leadership in the 
international community to the Soviet bloc, which was already 
trumpeting its strong advocacy of economic, social and cultural 
rights.‖14  As Mary Ann Glendon notes, ―[c]ontrary to later belief, the 
countries within the Soviet sphere of influence were neither alone nor 
the most vigorous in pushing for the inclusion of social and economic 
rights. . . . [N]o nation opposed them in principle.‖15 
While Eleanor Roosevelt maintained that economic, social, and 
cultural rights could not be regarded as justiciable in the same way as 
civil and political rights, she agreed to their inclusion in the Universal 
Declaration.  However, Latin American delegates were particularly 
forceful about the inclusion of these rights, as was René Cassin of 
France.  The views expressed in the debate and the placement of 
these rights in the overall arrangement of the articles nevertheless 
reveal a lower ranking than civil and political rights, which is similar 
 
13. It is also worth recalling that President Roosevelt, in his State of the Union Message 
of 1944, said that: 
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot 
exist without economic security and independence.  ―Necessitous men are not free 
men.‖  People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships 
are made.  In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident.  
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of 
security and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of station, race, or 
creed. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Message to Congress on the State of 
the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 40–42 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).  See also Philip Alston, U.S. 
Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an 
Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT‘L L. 388 n.99 (1990).   
14. William Korey, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
in ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: HER DAY 21 (A. David Gurewitsch ed., 1973). 
15. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 185 (2001). 
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to the French revolutionary declarations.  Post-1948 developments in 
the U.N. have considerably expanded the normative and institutional 
space for economic, social, and cultural rights. 
A combination of Western traditions going back at least to the 
French Revolution, reflected in numerous national constitutions of 
the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, in the 1919 International Labour 
Organization (ILO) constitution, in Roosevelt‘s second bill of rights, 
and in the draft international bill of rights prepared by a committee of 
the American Law Institute, on the one hand, and socialist thinking 
and the legal system of Soviet-bloc countries, on the other, made it 
possible for the 1948 text to contain both sets of rights.  The doctrine 
of their equal value has been a canon of the United Nations ever 
since, in spite of practice to the contrary.  That canon is reflected in 
numerous statements of U.N. bodies,16 General Assembly resolu-
tions,17 and notably the declaration issued at the close of the World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993, which proclaimed: ―All 
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-
related.  The international community must treat human rights 
globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the 
same emphasis.‖18  The significance of this canon for the traditional 
separation of categories of human rights calls for a rethinking of the 
rationale behind the decision of the General Assembly in 1951, 
―largely on ideological grounds,‖19 that the Commission should draft 
separate covenants for each of the groups of rights.  Already in 1950 
Mrs. Roosevelt had felt obliged by the ―growth of isolationism and 
 
16. For example, a UNDP policy paper has outlined UNDP‘s strategy for integrating 
human rights into sustainable human development and called for a ―universal and holistic 
[approach], stressing the indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights—economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political.‖  U.N. Development Programme, Integrating Human 
Rights with Sustainable Human Development, at 16 (Jan. 1998), available at 
http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/HR_Pub_policy5.htm. 
17. As early as December 4, 1950 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 421E (V), 
U.N.Doc. A/1775, affirming that ―the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of 
economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent. . . . [W]hen 
deprived of economic, social and cultural rights man does not represent the human person 
whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man.‖  In a 1977 resolution, 
the General Assembly enumerated the concepts which should guide all future work of the 
U.N. on human rights, including ―equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to 
the implementation, promotion and protection of both‖ categories of human rights.  G.A. 
Res. 32/130, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/130 (Dec. 16, 1977). 
18. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).  
19. HUMPHREY, supra note 10, at 107. 
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anticommunism‖ at home to favor including only civil and political 
rights in the Covenant.20  The U.K. lost interest and eventually the 
General Assembly reached its decision to have the Commission draft 
two covenants, to be treated equally and opened for signature on the 
same date.  As Mary Ann Glendon describes it, ―[i]n practical terms 
the move made sense, but separating the political/civil liberties from 
the social/economic rights had a heavy cost: it undercut the Dec-
laration‘s message that one set of values could not long endure 
without the other.‖21 
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the distinctions are 
disappearing in theory and practice.  The traditional distinctions were 
based on several philosophical and practical considerations, ranging 
from the concept of negative and positive rights to resource 
allocations and institutional issues.  On closer examination of the 
rationale for separating categories of human rights, we can identify—
at the risk of oversimplifying—four philosophical or conceptual 
features and four practical or policy-based features  
I. CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN  
CATEGORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The conceptual bases relate to immutability, cultural bias, role of 
the state with respect to positive and negative rights, and political 
ideology favoring freedom or equality.  
A. Immutability 
At the theoretical level, the case is often made that civil and 
political rights are permanent and immutable, and are not subject to 
changing circumstances as they relate to the permanent nature of 
human beings.  Those who hold this view stress the priority of civil 
and political rights for human life and dignity, which are timeless, 
compared to economic, social, and cultural rights, which are 
conditional on societal development and programmatic realization 
over time.  This theory is strongly influenced by natural law, which 
attributes the permanence of human rights to the natural condition of 
human beings—that is, all humans have the same nature and 
therefore the same rights.  Since human nature does not change, then 
neither do human rights.  A second feature of natural law supportive 
 
20. GLENDON, supra note 15, at 196. 
21. Id. at 202.   
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of permanence of rights is the derivation of rights from natural 
justice, from an abstract appeal to Reason, or from a belief that these 
rights are ―God-given‖ or correspond to the Will of a Divine 
Presence (for those who adhere to an organized religion), or the Will 
of an abstract Deity (for those who adhere to the deist position).  
From all these perspectives, it is inconceivable that the definition of 
virtue as derived from these forces greater than humans would 
change over time, although the ability of human to apprehend the 
higher Will may be perfected. 
The strength of the arguments for permanence based on human 
nature depends on a belief in an abstract and unknowable source of 
justice accepted as a matter of faith rather than the scrutiny of 
scientific investigation.  The concept of human nature, however, has 
a place in the study of evolutionary biology and human behavior.  
The question for evolutionary biology is whether there is a 
comparative reproductive advantage of propensities such as empathy 
and altruism, which would explain the emergence of codes of human 
social behavior such as human rights.  There may be genetically 
determined basic human instincts of survival of the species and 
manifestations of empathy and altruism that evolutionary biology is 
only beginning to explain.22  Since human evolution is driven by 
reproductive selﬁshness, one could wonder why the human species 
would develop any ethical system, like that of human rights, 
according to which individuals manifest feeling for the suffering of 
others (empathy) and—even more surprising—act in self-sacriﬁcing 
ways for the beneﬁt of others without achieving any noticeable 
reproductive advantage.  And yet, as Paul Ehrlich notes in Human 
Natures, ―empathy and altruism often exist where the chances for any 
return for the altruist are nil.‖23  Natural selection does not provide 
the answer to moral behavior as ―there aren‘t enough genes to code 
the various required behaviors,‖ but rather ―cultural evolution is the 
source of ethics‖24 and therefore of human rights.  
The second scientific approach to understanding human nature 
holds that moral behavior is a human, social product developed by a 
process of biological and social evolution (associated with Hume, and 
also sentimentalist, subjectivist, or naturalistic approaches) or as a 
 
22. See PAUL R. EHRLICH, HUMAN NATURES: GENES, CULTURES, AND THE HUMAN 
PROSPECT 305–31 (2000).  
23. Id. at 312. 
24. Id. at 317. 
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sociological pattern of rule setting (as in the sociological theory of 
law and the work of Weber).  This approach includes the con-
tractarian notion that individuals in a society accept rules from 
legitimate authority in exchange for security and economic advantage 
(as in Rawls).  In legend, literature, religion, and political thought, 
justice and eventually the concept of human rights became socially 
constructed over time into complex webs of social interaction striving 
toward a social order in which human beings are treated fairly as 
individuals and collectivities.  The best-known histories of the human 
rights movement25 tend to begin with the ancient religions and 
societies and trace the evolution of understanding of human rights 
over time, reinforcing the idea that moral codes evolve with 
circumstances.  
Whether one uses a biological or a sociological lens to discern the 
origin of human rights in society, it is indisputable that the content of 
the norms evolves over time.  Slavery, torture, and subjugation of 
women and colonized populations are among the most obvious 
practices that were regarded as natural and just for long periods of 
human existence.  Clear human rights norms have emerged in recent 
times to exclude these practices from acceptable human behavior.  
Thus, this progressive awareness of new understandings of accept-
able treatment of humans and exigencies of social arrangements, 
including legislation and enforcement, explains the changes over time 
of the catalogue of civil and political as well as economic, social, and 
cultural rights.  Given these explanations of the evolution of human 
rights norms, there is no basis for considering that one category 
reflects values more timeless than the other.  It is tempting to cite life 
and bodily integrity as so basic that they have always been protected 
in human society and that certain social benefits or cultural practices 
are only recently regarded as deserving of protection, but history 
teaches us otherwise.  The social norm of caring for the needy has a 
long history while the prohibition of deliberate infliction of pain to 
obtain information is relatively recent, thus upending the assumption 
that civil and political rights are constant and economic, social, and 
cultural are ―new.‖  It is therefore disputable to justify the distinction 
between categories of rights on the relative permanence of the one 
compared to the other. 
 
25. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: 
VISIONS SEEN (2d ed. 2003); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, (1950).  
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B. Cultural Bias 
Another justification for the distinction between categories is 
based on cultural or civilizational bias, the concept of the auto-
nomous individual being characteristic of Western modernism and 
requiring that civil and political rights protect that autonomy, in 
contradistinction to other civilizations that value the group, whether 
the Asian values of duty to the family and king (state), or the 
dictatorship of the proletariat in societies that claim to be communist, 
or communal values in African societies.  From this perspective, civil 
and political rights are Western and made part of constitutional 
democratic regimes and of the expectations of the citizens, although 
they may be exported to other societies that are modernizing, either 
by building new nations out of a colonial legacy, which made them 
familiar with these rights, or in responding to the pressures of 
globalizing markets and ideas, as in China, and adapting their legal 
practices and constitutional norms as a result.  According to this 
view, a priority may have been placed on economic, social and 
cultural rights in non-Western societies either because it is the duty of 
the beneficent Asian king (and the successor state) to provide for his 
subjects, or because the dictates of charity in the religion or belief 
system of the society, or because the victory of the proletariat in the 
class struggle so requires. 
However, this approach, which has been articulated in the ―clash 
of civilizations‖ thesis, tends to consider large zones of human 
habitation as excessively monolithic.  Drawing on a classification of 
civilizations as Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, 
Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese, Samuel Huntington argues 
that ―individualism remains a distinguishing mark of the West among 
twentieth-century civilizations.‖26  Huntington considers the Western 
―tradition of individual rights and liberties unique among civilized 
societies.‖27  He agrees with Bilahari Kausikan of Singapore that the 
West, which ―wrote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,‖ has 
lost its leverage, especially over Asian countries.28  Huntington‘s 
thesis is flawed in several respects.  First, as Thomas Franck points 
out, he erroneously assumes that the most radically conservative 
 
26. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF 
WORLD ORDER 71 (1996). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 194; see also Surya Prakash Sinha, The Axiology of the International Bill of 
Human Rights, 1 PACE Y.B. INT‘L L. 21, 31–52 (1989).  
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manifestations of non-Western civilizations accurately represent them 
and that occidental culture is inherently liberal and tolerant.29  The 
reality is that non-Western civilizations are quite diverse in practices 
and beliefs and that ―autonomy and freedom of conscience are not 
any more indigenous to the West than to the East.‖30  Moreover, 
many Westerners ―probably not only do not oppose, but actually 
share with non-Western societies a commitment to community-based 
values and identity.‖31  In other words, in all societies there is a 
spectrum of individualistic and communitarian attitudes,32 and 
conflicts of values occur within as well as across civilizations.  
Second, Huntington neglects the authenticity of activists in people‘s 
movements in non-Western societies who espouse human rights 
without rejecting their own culture.  Human rights activists from non-
Western societies may find it more effective within their culture to 
seek change at the community level rather than through state 
institutions, as in the West, but such preferences are a matter of 
strategy based on cultural realities not on the inappropriateness of the 
human rights framework for their struggle for social justice.  Former 
human rights activist and later South Korean President Kim Dae Jung 
rejected the ―Asian values‖ argument of former Singaporian Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, which he found ―not only unsupportable but 
self-serving.‖33  For him, the Universal Declaration ―reflects basic 
respect for the dignity of people, and Asian nations should take the 
lead in implementing it.‖34  ―The biggest obstacle [to establishing 
democracy and strengthening human rights in Asia] is not its cultural 
heritage but the resistance of authoritarian rulers and their apo-
logists.‖35 
The debate over the cultural bias of human rights has not been laid 
to rest by these or other voices.  A vast amount of official pro-
nouncements and scholarly exegesis can be marshaled on either side 
of the debate.  The question for the purpose of challenging the 
excessive distinction between categories of rights is whether this 
 
29. Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91 Am. J. Int‘l L. 593, 
608 (1997).  
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 604. 
32. Id. at 605. 
33. Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny?  The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values, 73 
FOREIGN AFF. 189, 190 (1994). 
34. Id. at 194. 
35. Id. 
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claimed bias is related to civil and political rights as being Western, 
and economic, social, and cultural rights as being non-Western.  The 
Cold War obfuscated the debate as the West used international fora to 
criticize the stifling of freedom of expression, religion, movement, 
assembly, the denial of political rights, and the practice of arbitrary 
arrest and detention in socialist countries, while the latter denounced 
the contradictions of Western capitalism as responsible for the lack of 
economic, social, and cultural rights and the prevalence of racial 
discrimination in the West.  The reality is, of course, more complex.  
Most significant for present purposes is the long tradition in the West 
of supporting these rights, including Roosevelt‘s proposing a second 
bill of rights to cover them,36
 
and broad ratification of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) (the United States being the only major Western country 
not to ratify it).  In education and the media, it must be said that the 
United States is behind most countries on developing awareness of 
human rights, and it is rare to find issues of health, social security, 
food, and shelter articulated as matters of human rights, except by 
progressive social movements.  However, a survey shows that most 
of the public ―‗strongly‘ believe meeting people‘s basic needs of 
food, housing, and healthcare should be considered human rights.‖37  
The fact that the U.S. is behind other countries diplomatically does 
not justify the conclusion that culturally Americans do not understand 
access to basic health, education, food, and housing as a matter of 
human rights.  In other Western countries, the problem does not even 
arise.  In sum, it is not accurate to consider that economic, social, and 
cultural rights are not suitable to the West due to cultural notions of 
the nature of rights and should therefore be treated differently from 
civil and political rights. 
C. Role of the State in Realizing Positive and Negative Rights 
The third set of conceptual bases for the distinction between 
traditional categories of human rights has to do with the role of the 
state and the notion of negative vs. positive rights.  According to this 
perspective, civil and political rights are attributes of the human 
 
36. See Roosevelt, supra note 13. 
37. Belden, Russonello & Stewart Research & Commc‘n, Human Rights in the U.S.: 
Findings from a National Survey, (2007) at 4, available at http://opportunityagenda.org/files/ 
field_file/Human%20Rights%20Report%20-%202007%20public%20opinion.pdf (last visit-
ed Apr.20, 2009).   
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person with which the state must not interfere, and thus are best 
described as ―freedoms from state interference‖ or ―droits-attribut,‖ 
while economic, social and cultural rights are ―claims on the state,‖ 
or ―droits-créance.‖  Civil and political rights are ―negative‖ insofar 
as they enjoin the state from interfering in the individual‘s freedom to 
do whatever is not harmful to others, whereas economic and social 
rights are correlative to positive duties of the state to enable the 
individual to do what he or she would like to do.38  The former imply 
abstention of the state while that latter imply claims against the state 
for provision of services.  
Although intellectually appealing in its neatness, this distinction 
tends to oversimplify the process of realizing rights in practice.  First 
of all, considerable intervention by the state is necessary to achieve 
civil and political rights, including action to ensure that private 
parties do not violate the rights of others, and to give agents of the 
state the wherewithal to train and equip internal security forces so 
they can acquire information and confessions without resorting to 
torture, and to establish and maintain a system of courts and public 
defenders‘ offices necessary for a fair hearing and adequate legal 
defense.  Merely ―abstaining‖ cannot fulfill the state‘s duties under 
the social contract. 
The distinction between positive and negative rights is not the 
same as that between negative and positive liberty.  In his famous 
essay on ―Two Concepts of Liberty,‖ Isaiah Berlin treated the idea of 
negative liberty as referring to an individual being left to act or be as 
he or she pleases without interference of other persons, whereas 
positive liberty involved either the collective self-determination of 
the space of freedom, as in a democratic system, or control or 
mastery of someone else who determines the scope of one‘s actions.39  
Closely related to this distinction was the assumption that positive 
freedom was associated with authoritarianism and paternalism, and 
the Cold War perception in the West that the Soviet Union was 
claiming to realize positive freedom but was in fact totalitarian and 
 
38. This distinction was brilliantly argued by Quincy Wright in his contribution to a 
collection of philosophical essays produced by UNESCO to assist the drafters of the 
Universal Declaration.  Quincy Wright, Relationship Between Different Categories of 
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 143, 147 (UNESCO 
ed., Greenwood Press 1973) (1949).  
39. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Inaugural Lecture before the University of 
Oxford (Oct. 31, 1958), reprinted in  ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). 
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repressive, hence non-liberal.  The issue today is not whether to 
choose between positive and negative freedom but whether to attach 
practical consequences to the distinction between negative and 
positive human rights.   
Negative rights are somewhat akin to negative liberty in the sense 
that their enjoyment requires inaction on the part of others, whereas 
positive rights require action on the part of the duty holder.  Thus 
civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech, the right to vote, 
or the right to physical integrity, require abstention on the part of the 
state from banning speech, restricting voting rights, or abusing the 
person of a citizen.  Poverty, ignorance, illness, inability to bargain 
for the price of one‘s labor under conditions of exploitation, social 
inequalities, stigma, discrimination and similar factors are as con-
straining on an individual‘s liberty to be or act as he or she wishes as 
banning a publication or speech or assaulting or arbitrarily detaining 
a person.  The realization of human rights requires positive action to 
lift such constraints, such as providing education, protecting from 
discrimination, or regulating the labor market.  In this sense, 
economic, social and cultural rights are instrumental to negative 
freedom.  
Similarly, there are negative duties implied in the proper real-
ization of many economic, social and cultural rights.  Article 15 of 
the ICESCR on the right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and its applications refers to ―the right 
to freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activ-
ity.‖40  Leaving aside the material conditions necessary for the artists 
or scientists to be productive, the freedom to which that paragraph 
refers is a negative freedom.  
In the 1980s, Henry Shue provided a fairly systematic refutation of 
the claim that there are sharp and significant distinctions between 
positive and negative rights.  For him, ―neither rights to physical 
security nor rights to subsistence fit neatly into their assigned sides of 
the simplistic positive/negative dichotomy,‖ demonstrating ―that 
security rights are more ‗positive‘ than they are often said to be‖ and 
―subsistence rights are more ‗negative‘ than they are often said to 
be,‖ and he concludes that the distinctions, ―though not entirely 
 
40. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(3), Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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illusory, are too fine to support any weighty conclusions.‖41 
Rather than seek to redress the balance by enumerating negative 
freedoms in ESCR and positive freedoms in CPR, it is more pro-
ductive to draw on the practice of the past twenty years of 
interpreting the normative content of all human rights in terms of 
three types of obligations or duties, which are less abstract and more 
grounded in practice, namely, the obligations to respect, protect, and 
fulfill, the latter sometimes subdivided into the duties to facilitate and 
provide.  While this typology emerged with respect to defining 
obligations under the ICESCR,42 the obligations approach is even 
more relevant as a framework that applies equally to ESCR and CPR 
since it underscores that the state has duties that vary from preventing 
its agents from committing violations (duty to respect), and holding 
third parties accountable (duty to protect), to extending services (duty 
to fulfill) through information (duty to facilitate) and furnishing what 
otherwise cannot be obtained (duty to provide).  Such duties cannot 
be reduced to negative and positive obligations; they lead to a range 
of policy preferences for any right, regardless of category.  The ban 
on torture calls for (a) state agents not to torture, (b) the state to 
prevent private torture, (c) the state to train law enforcement officers 
to collect information without torture, and (d) considerable 
investment in providing a functioning prosecutorial and penal system 
adequate to eliminate the temptation to torture.  Similarly, health as a 
human right implies (a) duties on state agents not to discriminate in 
access to health services, (b) regulation over private health providers 
to meet various exigencies of this right, as well as (c) prevention and 
promotion campaigns, and (d) a state duty to provide certain services 
not met by the private sector or required in circumstances of severe 
deprivation or epidemic.  Clearly, it is far too simplistic to limit the 
realization of freedom from torture to the negative obligations ((a) 
above) of state agents and of the right to health to the positive 
obligation ((d) above) to provide health services.  In many specific 
instances the important developments in civil and political rights 
might relate to positive obligations and those in economic, social, and 
cultural rights to negative duties.  There is, of course, merit in the 
distinction between state abstention and state intervention as applied 
 
41. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 37 
(2d ed. 1996). 
42. See generally M. MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2003). 
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to the two categories of human rights; however, there are sufficient 
crossovers among positive and negative rights for this distinction not 
to justify the claim that there is a difference in nature between the 
two groups. 
D. Political Ideology Favoring Freedom or Equality 
Related to the previous conceptual basis for the distinction is the 
underlying philosophical basis for rights, expressed in terms of 
―freedom‖ or of ―equality‖ and the corresponding ideological under-
pinnings. 
The ―revolution of freedom‖ refers to the historical response to the 
arbitrary exercise of power by the monarchy in 18
th
 century Europe.  
It is the powerful idea that underlies both the establishment of the 
First Republic in France and the independence of the American 
colonies from the British Crown in the New World.  This is the 
response to the ―long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing 
invariably the same Object [which] evinces a design to reduce them 
under absolute Despotism‖ to which the Declaration of Independence 
refers.  The 1789 French Declaration was based on the belief that 
―the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole 
cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments.‖  
Out of this tradition there have emerged both the libertarian and 
liberal sets of political beliefs and action.  Adherents of the former 
stress that ―America was founded on the idea of Liberty; however 
oppressive the present statist government of America is, America and 
Liberty are one and the same.‖43  The preoccupation with liberty of 
18
th
 century France had to do primarily with what the Old Order 
lacked: tolerance for ideas (thought, conscience, religion, expression, 
and the press), parliamentary representation, and fair criminal justice.  
The most articulate and passionate voices in 1789 were those who 
defended liberty defined as ―the freedom to do everything which 
injures no one else,‖ according to article 4 of the 1789 Declaration.  
That text also defined the ―natural and imprescriptible rights of man‖ 
as ―liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.‖  (Article 
2.)  The 1793 Declaration defined these rights as ―equality, liberty, 
security, and property,‖ (article 2), and liberty as ―the power that 
belongs to man to do whatever is not injurious to the rights of 
 
43. Nation of Liberty Official Website: Home of the Libertarian Revolution, http://www. 
geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/3999 (last visited Apr. 17, 2009). 
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others,‖ (article 6).44 
A libertarian analysis of the Universal Declaration by Frank van 
Dun accepts the understanding of human rights similar to that of the 
French Declaration of 1789, the American Bill of Rights, and 
Locke‘s Second Treatise in UDHR Articles 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
16, and 17, but has serious problems with the economic, social, and 
cultural rights in Articles 22 through 28.  The Universal Declaration 
mistakenly presents these ―simply as human rights, as if they are of 
the same nature and on the same level as other rights, with their 
seemingly respectable ancestry,‖ according to van Dun.45  ―Anyone 
familiar with the classical doctrine of natural rights,‖ he continues, 
―will see . . . that the UD‘s distinctive ‗rights‘ are incompatible with 
that doctrine.‖46  The UDHR reads, for him, like ―an original 
manifesto of the philosophy of the welfare state.‖47  The claims on 
resources posed by such ―rights‖ are intolerable for the real rights 
since ―a person‘s life, liberty, and property are thrown upon the 
enormous heap of desirable scarce resources to which all people are 
said to have a right.‖48  Such ―rights to‖ are incompatible in this view 
with natural rights and he therefore rejects the idea ―that one‘s rights 
are as unlimited as one‘s desires, and, thus, are the primary sources of 
conflict and disorder.‖   
A more classical liberal approach to human rights, such as that 
represented by Maurice Cranston, also finds reason to treat CPR as 
real rights and ESCR as aspirations.49  It has been the official position 
of the government of the United States, alone among Western 
democracies, to find the whole category of ESCR as so different in 
nature from CPR as not to be human rights at all.  The ideological 
significance of this position is to reinforce the separation of 
categories and to resist the redistribution objective of the perceived 
ideological enemy of equality. 
The political ideology favoring the ―revolution of equality‖ also 
finds its roots in the French Revolution.  That momentous event is a 
 
44. 1793 CONST. arts. 2, 6 (Fr.). 
45. Frank van Dun, Human Dignity: Reason Or Desire?  Natural Rights Versus Human 
Rights, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1, 5 (2001). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 7. 
48. Id. at 10. 
49. Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND 
THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43–53 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1967).  
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constant reference point for the development of Marxism, whether in 
The Jewish Question, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 
The Civil War in France, or Critique of the Gotha Program.  Marx 
referred to the ―gigantic broom of the French Revolution of the 
eighteenth century,‖ which ―swept away all these relics of bygone 
times,‖ i.e., ―all manner of mediaeval rubbish, seigniorial rights.‖50  
From the grand Socialist History of the French Revolution by Jaurès51 
to the socialist and libertarian Lutte des Classes sous la Première 
République by Daniel Guérin52 and the writings of Albert Soboul and 
Georges Lefebvre, the French Revolution has been a preferred 
subject of scholarship for the left, until the revisionism of the last 
twenty years, which was in vogue during the bicentenary in 1989.  
The historiography of the French Revolution is inseparable from the 
development of socialist thought and its critiques.  Socialist and 
social democratic ideas galvanized the revolutions of 1848, 1871, and 
1917.  The drafters of the UDHR were aware of those ideas and the 
provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights in numerous 
European and Latin American constitutions. 
The ―revolution of equality‖ is indeed that part of the revolutionary 
tradition that challenged the privileges of those who dominate in 
society through titles and wealth.  There is, of course, a strong 
egalitarian theme in the liberal tradition and an abhorrence of 
arbitrary abuse of state power among most socialists.  Do their 
differences justify keeping two categories of human rights separate?  
It is only the extreme views of liberty that would reject equality, and 
of equality that would suppress freedom; most political philosophies 
on the right and the left allow for a balancing of both in a broad 
ideological middle-ground between the libertarian rejection of all 
welfare as theft, at the one extreme, and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat at the other.  Contemporary human rights continues to 
provide legitimate aspirations for greater equality in states built on 
strong liberal traditions and for greater freedom in states that have 
provided strong support for the material needs of the population.  The 
―social and international order‖ to which Article 28 of the Universal 
 
50. KARL MARX, THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE, reprinted in part in MODERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT: READINGS FROM MACHIAVELLI TO NIETZSCHE 874 (David Wootton ed., 1996). 
51. JEAN JAURÈS, HISTOIRE SOCIALISTE DE LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE (Albert Soboul 
ed., Éditions Socials 1969) (1924). 
52. DANIEL GUÉRIN, LA LUTTE DES CLASSES SOUS LA PREMIÈRE RÉPUBLIQUE 1793–1797 
(2d ed. 1968). 
17 MARKS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2009  2:35 PM 
2009] THE SEPARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTO CATEGORIES 227 
Declaration refers is one that presumably would temper the excesses 
of any regime, whether ideologically to the left or the right; it would 
call for political prisoners to be released from Cuba, while acknow-
ledging that country‘s high levels of achievement in education and 
health and call for universal health coverage and greater equality of 
access to quality education in the United States, while hailing the 
protections available to citizens against arbitrary exercise of power.  
The value of a holistic approach to human rights is to favor both 
freedom and equality in proportion to the democratically determined 
preferences of each society.  Maintaining separate categories of rights 
for each ideological preference undermines that approach.  
II. POLICY-BASED DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The practical or policy-based distinctions between the two 
categories of rights concern implementation, justiciability, violations, 
and resources.  The assumption underlying the separation of rights of 
the UDHR into two covenants was primarily practical, although 
philosophical distinctions were voiced.  The practical reasoning for 
treating some rights as categorically different from others began with 
a consideration of the appropriate means of implementation.  
A. Implementation 
Thus, civil and political rights were deemed to be immediately 
enforceable, whereas economic, social, and cultural rights were 
deemed to be subject to progressive implementation.  The core 
obligations set out in Article 2 of each Covenant reflected this 
distinction, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) specifying that ―[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant,‖ and that an effective remedy be provided in case 
of violation; and the ICESCR stipulating that ―[e]ach State Party to 
the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially eco-
nomic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.‖  This difference in imple-
mentation is, moreover, the principal reason why the Commission on 
Human Rights decided to draft two Covenants rather than one.  
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However, at the national level, there is little doubt that states 
confront practices and imbedded habits that make it difficult to take 
this distinction too literally.  Where prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials lack training and incentives to abide by human rights rules 
governing treatment of offenders, the full realization of the rights not 
to be subjected to torture or arbitrary arrest or detention calls for 
progressive measures.  The same is true for the independence of the 
judiciary and the process of free and fair elections.  These institutions 
require efforts over generations to be up to the task of full respect for 
the related civil and political rights.  This obvious fact does not mean 
that acts of torture, mistreatment, and denial of justice or free and fair 
elections do not violate national and international norms.  They do.  
But they must be seen in the context of progressive measures taken to 
improve the system.  
Similarly, the progressive implementation of ESCR is now under-
stood by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as 
requiring: (a) that the rights in question be exercised without 
discrimination;53 (b) that the state comply with a ―minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights;‖54 and (c) that they take 
immediate steps, which ―should be deliberate, concrete and targeted 
as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in 
the Covenant.‖55  None of these three requirements is subject to 
progressive realization. 
Thus the distinction between categories of rights on the basis of 
immediate vs. progressive implementation is only partially accurate.  
Most scholars and lawyers have accepted the reasoning of the 
Committee that rights of both categories imply obligations to respect, 
protect, promote, and provide.  Which of these obligations looms 
large depends on circumstances, not on categorical distinctions.  
B. Justiciability 
The reference to an ―effective remedy‖ in Article 2(3) of the 
ICCPR without an equivalent in the ICESCR suggests that judicial 
 
53. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm‘n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/1991/23/Annex III (Dec. 14, 1990), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ 
(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+3.En?OpenDocument. 
54. Id. ¶ 10. 
55. Id. ¶ 2. 
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remedies apply only to civil and political rights, making economic, 
social, and cultural rights more ―programmatic‖ and ―aspirational.‖  
In practice, the maturity of the judicial system and the way legislation 
is drafted determine whether and how claims regarding legally 
protected rights may be litigated, not whether the right protects 
individual autonomy or ensures a social need.  Indeed, the same 
Article 2(3) refers to the determination of rights ―by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority‖ and only requires States Parties ―to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; [and t]o ensure that the competent 
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.‖  Thus the 
immediate justiciability of ICCPR rights is not required.   
Many ESCR are protected by law, such as access to schools, 
tenants‘ rights in housing, payment of benefits under a pension, 
unemployment or other safety-net schemes, or access to health care.  
While it is true that the state may not wish to create a cause of action 
regarding a service that it is only beginning to put in place or may 
consider that the market will provide the services through private 
insurance schemes or supply and demand in labor or real estate, the 
courts or the legislature may—and usually do—allow citizens and 
sometimes aliens to sue in order to benefit from an appropriate 
remedy when the state has failed in its obligation to respect, protect, 
facilitate, or provide.  Typically such litigation concerns the duty to 
respect when the state has failed to provide a mandated service or has 
discriminated against the plaintiff, or the duty to protect when the 
state has failed to prevent a third party, such as a business enterprise, 
from harming health through pollution or a dangerous product, or 
failing to respect mandatory conditions of housing, or destroying or 
damaging an object placed under the protection of national heritage, 
to name obvious examples.  In all these cases, the economic, social, 
or cultural right in question may be considered to be justiciable.  The 
failure to provide a remedy, for example, in cases of alleged torture 
or prolonged detention without charge, suggests that the justiciability 
of civil and political rights is not always respected, even in advanced 
democracies. 
Some confusion might have existed in the first decades following 
the entry into force of the ICESCR, when little comparative research 
had been done on actual case law concerning ESCR.  In recent 
decades, a vast amount of case law has been collected so as to make 
unsustainable the claim that justiciability attaches to CRP but not to 
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ESCR, or not to the same degree.  For example, a recent compilation 
of essays documents nearly 2,000 judgments and decisions from 
twenty-nine national and international jurisdictions covering such 
issues as resettlement following eviction, regulation of private 
medical plans, and state support to anti-poverty and illiteracy 
programs, and addresses the extent to which economic, social, and 
cultural rights are justiciable.56  The special rapporteurs on the rights 
to adequate food, education and health have established or referred to 
databases of case law in which the rights in question have been 
adjudicated.  In a general comment on domestic application of the 
Covenant, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
considered that the view that judicial remedies were essential for 
violations of CPR but not for ESCR was ―not warranted either by the 
nature of the rights or by the relevant Covenant provisions.‖57  The 
Committee concluded on this point: 
The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and 
cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond the 
reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and incompatible 
with the principle that the two sets of human rights are 
indivisible and interdependent.  It would also drastically curtail 
the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.58 
A particularly telling example of the judicial examination of ESCR, 
including allocation of resources, is provided by the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, which decided in the Soobramoney case in 
1997 that ―the state has to manage its limited resources‖ and, in this 
case of a man suffering kidney failure, would not require the state to 
provide renal dialysis under the right to health because to do so ―the 
health budget would have to be dramatically increased to the 
prejudice of other needs which the state has to meet.‖59  Then, in 
South Africa v Grootboom in 2000, the Court interpreted the right to 
 
56. See SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Malcolm Langford ed., 2009); see also THE ROAD TO A REMEDY: 
CURRENT ISSUES IN THE LITIGATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (John 
Squires, Malcolm Langford & Bret Thiele eds., 2005).  
57. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1998/24 CESCR (Dec. 3, 1998).   
58. Id.   
59. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) paras. 28, 
31 (S. Afr.). 
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adequate housing as requiring the state to ―provide relief for people 
who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are 
living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.‖60  For present 
purposes it is worth highlighting the Court‘s dictum: ―The question is 
therefore not whether socio-economic rights are jusiticiable under our 
Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given case.‖61  In 2002, the 
Court decided, in the landmark Treatment Action Campaign case, 
that the constitutional guarantee of the right to health required the 
government to provide to pregnant women a drug known to reduce 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV, noting that the government 
―has to find the resources‖ to comply with a court order and ―[w]here 
a breach of any right has taken place, including a socio-economic 
right, a court is under a duty to ensure that effective relief is 
granted.‖62  
 The distinction of categories of human rights thus finds a 
particularly weak justification on the ground that one category is 
justiciable while the other is not.  Clearly, the courts adjudicate 
human rights of all types and categories depending on the domestic 
incorporation of the international standard and the extent to which the 
legal status of the right in question renders litigation possible and 
practicable, as opposed to other available remedies. 
C. Violations 
Related to the justification of the distinction on grounds of 
justiciability is the assumption that it is only appropriate to speak of 
―violations‖ with respect to civil and political rights.  The argument 
here is that it is appropriate to apply a ―violations‖ approach to civil 
and political rights, whereas a ―programmatic‖ approach is indicated 
for economic, social, and cultural rights.  However, the realization of 
 
60. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para. 99 (S. Afr.).   
61. Id. para. 20. 
62. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) para. 99 (S. 
Afr.).  In fact the court went beyond a declaratory order, stating:  
We thus reject the argument that the only power that this Court has in the present 
case is to issue a declaratory order.  Where a breach of any right has taken place, 
including a socio-economic right, a court is under a duty to ensure that effective 
relief is granted.  The nature of the right infringed and the nature of the 
infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in a particular case.  
Where necessary this may include both the issuing of a mandamus and the exercise 
of supervisory jurisdiction. 
Id. para. 106 (footnote omitted). 
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civil and political rights cannot be limited to dealing with violations 
and economic, social, and cultural rights can also be violated.  Part of 
the justification for the claim that a violations approach is not 
appropriate for economic, social, and cultural rights is the assumption 
that compliance with these rights is best assessed in terms of the 
outcome of programs that are more or less effective in delivering the 
services, whereas accountability for civil and political rights is a 
matter of identifying and punishing those who violate these rights.  
Certainly, a country that refuses to hold free and fair elections, a law 
enforcement department that brutalizes suspects, a security policy 
that engages in extraordinary rendition, prolonged detention without 
charge, and torture, is guilty of violations of civil and political rights.  
But this failure to realize civil and political rights also involves 
inadequate training, failure to enact appropriate legislation and 
similar measures for which it may not be easy to identify the duty-
holder accountable for the failure to eliminate these abuses from the 
system of criminal justice or the administration of elections.  Along 
with accountability for violations attributable to individuals is the 
requirement that effective preventive programs reduce the incentives 
to commit violations, which is best advanced through a cooperative 
mode of encouraging, cajoling, assisting, or otherwise cooperating 
with state officials to seek improvement of human rights per-
formance.  The choice between the violations and the cooperation 
approach is a tactical matter for other governments, international 
partners, and civil society organizations to assess.  A government that 
is willing to accept international assistance and cooperation to 
improve the practice of its law enforcement officials may reject 
accusations of responsibility for violations of the rights of detained or 
incarcerated persons.  Without denying the right to redress of alleged 
victims of violation, there are advantages to walking through the 
open door of cooperation, which may be slammed shut for those who 
focus exclusively on public denunciation of violations.  Thus, there 
are situations in which CPR may be advanced more effectively 
through the cooperation mode.  Similarly, there are situations where 
the promotion of ESCR, normally pursued in the cooperation mode, 
may require a violations approach.  When policies and practices that 
are so ill-conceived and rife with corruption that they are the direct 
cause of famine, epidemics of preventable disease, horrendous 
working conditions, and similar grave abuses, they cross the line; 
these acts and omissions are best treated as violations of economic, 
social, and cultural rights. 
17 MARKS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2009  2:35 PM 
2009] THE SEPARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTO CATEGORIES 233 
This matter was addressed by the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, drafted by a 
group of more than thirty experts who met in Maastricht, the 
Netherlands, from January 22–26, 1997 at the invitation of the 
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, Switzerland), the 
Urban Morgan Institute on Human Rights (Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A.), 
and the Centre for Human Rights of the Faculty of Law of Maastricht 
University.  More than a decade ago, the experts agreed that it was 
―undisputed that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, 
interrelated and of equal importance for human dignity.  Therefore, 
states are as responsible for violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights as they are for violations of civil and political rights.‖63  
The Guidelines insist on treating violations the same for both 
categories of rights: ―As in the case of civil and political rights, the 
failure by a State Party to comply with a treaty obligation concerning 
economic, social and cultural rights is, under international law, a 
violation of that treaty.‖64  The Guidelines also applied the same 
concept of obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill that is used for 
civil and political rights, concluding with respect to economic, social, 
and cultural rights that ―[f]ailure to perform any one of these three 
obligations constitutes a violation of such rights.‖65  They further 
clarified that ―a violation of economic, social and cultural rights 
occurs when a State pursues, by action or omission, a policy or 
practice which deliberately contravenes or ignores obligations of the 
Covenant, or fails to achieve the required standard of conduct or 
result.‖66   
In the same spirit, the Guidelines defined the types of actions and 
omissions that constitute violations of these rights, responsibilities, 
and remedies, and recommended that ―[t]he optional protocol pro-
viding for individual and group complaints in relation to the rights 
recognized in the Covenant should be adopted and ratified without 
delay.‖67  It took nearly twelve more years for that recommendation 
to be implemented.  On Human Rights Day, December 10, 2008, the 
 
63. International Comm‘n of Jurists (ICJ), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 4 (Jan. 26, 1997), available at http://www.unhcr. 
org/refworld/docid/48abd5730.html [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines]. 
64. Id. ¶ 5. 
65. Id. ¶ 6.  
66. Id. ¶ 11. 
67. Id. ¶ 31. 
17 MARKS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2009  2:35 PM 
234 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:209 
General Assembly finally adopted the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.68  
This act is a clear signal that there is no longer an expectation that 
economic, social, and cultural rights need be treated differently from 
civil and political with respect to violations.   
D. Resources 
The final—and perhaps most widely cited—basis for separating 
the two categories is that of allocation of resources, according to 
which civil and political rights, being negative and implying absten-
tion by the state, do not require resources, whereas economic, social, 
and cultural rights, being positive, are resource-dependent. 
However, the weaknesses already discussed of the distinction 
between negative and positive rights from a philosophical perspective 
are particularly evident when it comes to resources.  Comparing the 
costs of programs to protect subsistence rights (ESCR) and security 
rights (CPR), Henry Shue notes, ―Which program was more costly or 
more complicated would depend upon the relative dimension of the 
respective problems and would be unaffected by any respect in which 
security is ‗negative‘ and subsistence is ‗positive.‘‖69 
Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, in The Cost of Rights: Why 
Liberty Depends on Taxes, demonstrate how all rights require tax 
payer-funded and government-managed services, whether courts, law 
enforcement, administrative agencies, or other institutionalized 
guarantees that the contract, property, liability-based, or other right 
will be enforced.  This argument cuts both ways for international 
human rights.  On the one hand, the principal message of their book 
that ―private liberties have public costs,‖ and that ―all rights are 
positive‖70 provides a convincing rebuttal to the argument that CPR 
and ESCR are fundamentally different from the resource perspective.  
On the other hand, they examine the costs of rights from the 
perspective of the legal and economic system of the United States 
and are somewhat dismissive of international human rights.  The 
―ostensibly legal rights guarantees‖ of international human rights 
 
68. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008). 
69. SHUE, supra note 41, at 39.  
70. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES 48 (1999). 
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instruments are not worthy of consideration ―unless subscribing 
national states—capable of taxing and spending—reliably support 
international tribunals, such as those in Strasbourg or The Hague, 
where genuine redress can be sought when such rights are violated.  
―In practice,‖ they continue: 
rights become more than mere declarations only if they confer 
power on bodies whose decisions are legally binding (as the 
moral rights announced in the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, for example, do not).  As a general 
rule, unfortunate individuals who do not live under a govern-
ment capable of taxing and delivering an effective remedy 
have no legal rights.71  
Oddly they refer to redress from The Hague, which, if they have the 
various criminal tribunals or the ICJ in mind, does not provide 
―genuine redress‖ for individuals.  They cite Article 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights for the proposition that the 
rights are ―reliably enforced when the subscribing states treat them as 
part of domestic law.‖72  The fact is that most of the treaty 
monitoring, whether by the regional human rights courts and 
commissions or by the U.N. treaty bodies or by special procedures, 
has to do with domestic incorporation of international human rights 
norms, and many states parties, including poor countries, take very 
seriously the need for legal remedies.  On this point, the observations 
made above on justiciability respond in part to Holmes‘ and Sun-
stein‘s dismissal of international human rights regimes that do not 
meet their standard of ―government capable of taxing and delivering 
an effective remedy.‖  
Their presumed doubts that many countries can meet that standard 
might be contrasted with their consideration of how the U.S. Supreme 
Court interprets the Bill of Rights.  They acknowledge that: 
some important constitutional rights are plausibly styled as 
duties of the government to forbear rather than to perform.  
But even those ‗negative rights‘—such as prohibition on 
 
71. Id. at 19.  One may wonder to what tribunal in The Hague they refer since the ICJ 
and the ICC or other penal tribunals located in that city do not deal with domestic application 
of international human rights law.  They probably did not have Dutch courts applying the 
Covenants in mind, although they do constitute a good example of justicability of ESCR 
since the Netherlands, like other countries having a monist system, applies the ICESCR 
directly through its courts.  
72. Id. at 237 n.5. 
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double jeopardy and excessive fines—will be protected only if 
they find a protector, only if there exists a supervisory state 
body, usually a court of some kind, able to force its will upon 
the violators or potential violations of the right at issue.73   
The issue does not even arise in many other jurisdictions since the 
courts are expected to deal with allocation of resource issues that 
affect the implementation of constitutionally protected ESCR derived 
from international human rights, as the example from the Consti-
tutional Court of South Africa cited above attests.74  
In sum, the distinction between CPR and ESCR in international 
human rights law on the grounds that, in general, the former are cost 
free while the latter require state resources has lost its cogency, along 
with the seven other bases for that categorical distinction discussed 
above.  To conclude, it may be useful to summarize, in the following 
table, the main features which have been used to distinguish the two 
categories and the core arguments which have progressively 
challenged that distinction: 
 
73. Id. at 53–54. 
74. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.  There are undeniable difficulties in 
enforcing the orders of the South African Constitutional Court but it is by far preferable that 
human rights be protected under the Constitution and treaty obligations, affirmed by the 
courts, and to struggle with effective enforcement, than to take as the starting point that 
human rights involving positive duties have no place in the legal system. 
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Features Traditionally Used to Distinguish Civil and Political from 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
Feature Traditional 
characteristic of 
civil and  
political rights  
(CPR) 
Traditional 
characteristic of 
economic, social, 
and cultural rights 
(ESCR) 
Rationale for challenging 
the distinction 
A. FEATURES MAINLY OF A PHILOSOPHICAL OR CONCEPTUAL NATURE 
Permanence Absolute, 
immutable 
Relative, responsive 
to changing 
conditions 
All rights emerge in a 
historical context and take on 
priority status when affirmed 
as human rights. 
Cultural bias Based on Western 
economic and 
political liberalism 
Based on models of 
centrally planned 
socialist system or 
Eastern enlightened 
king 
All political systems, whether 
monarchy, democracy, or 
socialist,  provide for 
constitutionally guaranteed 
rights of people or citizens. 
Role of the state 
 
Negative rights 
(freedom from state 
intervention), free 
markets 
Positive rights 
(claims to benefits 
from the state), 
welfare state 
Varying degrees of the duties 
to respect, protect, and fulfill 
apply to all rights and make 
the positive/negative 
distinction of limited value in 
defining the role of the state. 
Underlying 
philosophical 
objective 
Freedom/autonomy Equality/solidarity Freedom requires both CPR 
and ESCR, and equality must 
be assured in relation to  
both, although the degree of 
redistribution of resources 
can vary. 
B. FEATURES MAINLY OF A PRACTICAL OR POLICY-RELEVANT NATURE 
Approach to 
implementation 
Immediate 
implementation 
Progressive 
implementation 
Elements of immediate and 
of progressive 
implementation apply to all 
rights in varying degrees. 
Availability of 
Judicial 
remedies 
 
Justiciable Political or 
programmatic 
All rights require remedies 
and eventually become 
justiciable as legal redress is 
provided. 
Relation to 
violations 
Violations can be 
identified and 
denounced 
Violations are 
unsuitable to 
cooperation mode 
Both violations and 
cooperation modes may be 
appropriate for any given 
right, depending on 
circumstances. 
Allocation of 
resources 
Cost-free 
(individual 
freedom), rights as 
immunities 
Resources required 
(welfare), rights as 
entitlements 
Resources are needed for the 
realization of CPR, and most 
ESCR can be realized with 
minimum investment. 
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CONCLUSION 
A holistic approach to the relations among CPR and ESCR avoids 
misleading categorization of human rights, although the two Coven-
ants, each devoted to one of the traditional categories, remain the 
standard reference documents.  The separation of human rights into 
two categories appears to be discouraged by the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and more recent formal texts that support 
this holistic approach.  The Universal Declaration, in Article 28, 
refers to the right to ―a social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized.‖  The reference to a ―social and international order‖ 
suggests a concern for social structures conducive to the realization 
of rights that cover the civil, cultural, economic, political, and social 
domains.  Such structures imply a holistic framework in which the 
cumulative effect of realizing all types of human rights is a structural 
change, that is, an altering of the power relations with the society.  
The addition of the term ―international‖ means that the change in 
power relations not only occurs with national societies but also at the 
level of international relations and the international political eco-
nomy.  That is a reformist and perhaps a revolutionary aspiration in 
the sense that full realization of both sets of human rights does imply 
in most societies alteration of power relations.  In the last analysis, 
the transformation of human rights from their legitimate status of 
morally justified entitlements to rights that are legally enforced and 
enjoyed in practice, from capability to functioning, is the essential 
project for human rights realization.  The ―right‖ to the social and 
international order described in Article 28 does not describe the 
existing order but rather the potential order towards which a holistic 
approach to human rights aspires. 
Various formulations of the holistic approach appear in the 
Declaration on the Right to Development,75 the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action,76 the mandate of the High Commissioner 
 
75. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 6(2), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128/Annex (Dec. 4, 1986) (―All human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to 
the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights.‖). 
76. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 18, ¶ 5 (―All human rights 
are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.  The international community 
must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with 
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for Human Rights,77 and in expert formulations such as the the 
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.78  Beyond the reaffirmation that all human rights are 
interdependent and interrelated, the holistic approach also recognizes 
that both categories require resources, both can involve violations, 
both require adaptation and often transformation of institutions and 
practices, and both are essential for human dignity.  The Human 
Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme 
for the year 2000 (HDR2000) dispels four myths about the two 
categories of rights by clarifying that both categories include positive 
and negative rights, involve immediate and progressive imple-
mentation, require resources, and require quantitative and qualitative 
indicators.79  HDR2000 gives examples of how, in practice, the 
exercise of civil and political rights has been instrumental in 
empowering poor people and advancing economic, social, and 
cultural rights.  In the context of development, the holistic approach 
means that all human rights, not just the right that appears most 
relevant to the task at hand, must be considered.  In urban planning, 
for example, it is not enough to consider that the allocation of 
resources to affordable housing is a contribution to the right to 
shelter; the planner must ask what the plan will do for the residents‘ 
enjoyment of rights to health, food, education, information, work, and 
effective remedies, to mention only the most obvious ones.  The 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights assumes in its 
training materials for staff and for national human rights institutions 
 
the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of 
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.‖).   
77. G.A. Res. 48/141, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (Dec. 20, 1993) (stating that the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights shall ―[b]e guided by the recognition that all human 
rights—civil, cultural, economic, political and social—are universal, indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated and that, while the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in 
mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to 
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms‖). 
78. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 62, ¶ 4 (―It is now undisputed that all human 
rights are indivisible, interdependent, interrelated and of equal importance for human 
dignity. Therefore, states are as responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights as they are for violations of civil and political rights.‖). 
79. U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000, at 93 box 5.5 
(2000), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2000_EN.pdf. 
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that the two main categories of human rights ―are not fundamentally 
different from one another, either in law or in practice.‖80 
Outside of the circles of academics, bureaucrats, and government 
representatives who adhere to U.N. dogma, there is considerable 
confusion regarding the separation of human rights into two cate-
gories.  Numerous economists still hold the view that the end of 
development is growth and market efficiency, or place an absolute 
value on the free market.  They look with suspicion on any govern-
ment intervention and find human rights useful only to the extent that 
they protect the right to property, and they find civil and political 
liberties necessary because they are conducive to transparency and 
accountability, which contribute to economic efficiency.  They would 
deem any use of economic, social, and cultural rights for the purpose 
of redistribution as confusing rights with desires.  Similarly some in 
the human rights field consider that only civil and political rights, 
encapsulating human freedom, are properly human rights and that the 
promotion of economic, social, and cultural well-being may be a 
useful agenda for government policy but not for human rights.  In 
sum, free-enterprise economists and the libertarian or conservative 
rights theorists stress individual freedom and sanctity of property81 
and reject the concept of economic, social, and cultural rights as 
undermining human freedom and economic efficiency. 
The alternative position is that ESCR are as fundamental to human 
agency and dignity and as definitional of human existence and 
fulfillment as CPR.  ―[W]hen deprived of economic, social and 
cultural rights,‖ the General Assembly affirmed in 1950, ―man does 
not represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration 
regards as the ideal of the free man.‖82  All governments have 
formally recognized both sets of human rights in the Universal 
 
80.  OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS 3 (2005). 
81. The argument that pro-growth policies based on economic freedom empower the 
poor is made by Jean-Pierre Chauffour, in Pro-Human Rights Growth Policies, 7 
DEVELOPMENT OUTREACH, Oct. 2006, http://www.devoutreach.com/oct06/SpecialReport/ 
tabid/1513/Default.aspx.  This former senior economist at the IMF and current economic 
advisor at the World Bank has developed these ideas in a recent book published by the Cato 
Institute.  See JEAN-PIERRE CHAUFFOUR, THE POWER OF FREEDOM: UNITED DEVELOPMENT 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009). 
82. G.A. Res. 421E (V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 4, 1950). 
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Declaration and constantly reaffirmed that all human rights are 
universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.  The separation 
during the Cold War between categories of rights was fraught with 
ideological overtones, most of which have dissipated with the end of 
East–West ideological confrontation.  It is true, as David Beetham 
insightfully put it: 
Although in theory the end of the Cold War could have 
provided an opportunity for ending the sterile opposition 
between the two sets of human rights, in practice it has 
reinforced the priorities of the U.S.A., the country which has 
been most consistently opposed to the idea of economic and 
social rights.83 
He is correct that the United States Government  
believes that while the progressive realization of Economic, 
Social and Cultural rights requires government action, these 
rights are not an immediate entitlement to a citizen.  Sovereign 
states should determine—through open, participatory debate 
and democratic processes—the combination of policies and 
programs they consider will be most effective in progressively 
realizing the needs of their citizens.84   
Nevertheless, the U.S. return to multilateralism and membership in 
the Human Rights Council under the Obama Administration may 
diminish the impact of U.S. exceptionalism regarding ESCR. Many 
responses to concerns expressed by the skeptics, including U.S. 
government lawyers, may be found in the general comments of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,85 in debates 
among the leading scholars and practitioners,86 and in the practice of 
 
83. David Beetham, What Future for Economic and Social Rights, 43 POL. SYS. 41, 43 
(1995).   
84. See David Hohman, U.S. Delegate, Statement Before the 61st Commission on 
Human Rights: Explanation of Vote (Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.us-
mission.ch/humanrights/2005/0415Item10L27.htm.  U.S. NGOs and most academics do not 
accept this interpretation.  See, for example, the work of the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights, http://www.cesr.org, and the Poor People‘s Economic Human Rights Campaign, 
www.economichumanrights.org (both last visited Apr. 17, 2009). 
85. The texts of the nineteen General Comments issued so far are available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm. 
86. See Mary Robinson, Advancing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Way 
Forward, 26 HUM RTS. Q. 866 (2004); Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 
HUM RTS. Q. 63 (2004). 
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international institutions and bilateral aid programs that have 
successfully applied a human rights-based approach to their work in 
the fields of education, health, social security, labor, housing, and 
other domains of economic, social, and cultural rights.  In many parts 
of the world a willingness to work for ESCR adds legitimacy to 
efforts to promote CPR. 
 
 
Twenty-first century human rights thinking has evolved beyond 
the Cold War divide and ―the sterile opposition between the two sets 
of human rights.‖  The conceptual distinctions based on permanence, 
cultural bias, the role of the state, and political philosophy have lost 
their cogency since rights in both categories build on a shared 
understanding of core values of freedom, autonomy, equality and 
solidarity at a particular historical moment and provide a standard of 
achievement that transcends and builds on the best features of 
capitalism and socialism, in a world where neither is feasible in its 
pure form.  The practical grounds for treating the two groups 
differently based on modes of implementation, including the use of 
the courts, reference to violations, and allocation of resources, have 
also lost their cogency since both sets of human rights require 
immediate and progressive measures, both have justiciable and 
programmatic elements, both are advanced by reference to cooper-
ation and violations, and both involve the use in varying degrees of 
action by and resources of the state. 
The human rights agenda sixty years after the adoption of the 
UDHR calls for a translation of the rhetorical commitment to a 
holistic and integrated approach to human rights into the further 
development of tools of implementation, monitoring, measuring, and 
thinking common to both sets of human rights.  The trends among 
treaty bodies, U.N. agencies, and NGOs are clearly moving in that 
direction.  The aim of this article has been to suggest the implications 
of these trends for the restoration of the unity of human rights that 
has been put into question since 1951.  The essence of human rights 
is to define priorities based on what is most valued by the society.  
The values represented by one set of human rights are no less 
valuable than those of the other, including under times of stress when 
national security or economic prosperity are threatened and under 
attack.  Human rights function to provide a bulwark against the 
temptation to sacrifice anyone‘s freedom or subsistence in response 
to such stress.  Under any given circumstance, the urgency and 
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effective means of implementation will vary from one right to the 
next.  The false dichotomy of ESCR and CPR has outlived its 
usefulness.  It is time to move on to a more holistic and integrated 
understanding and practice of human rights. 
